

# HOW TRENDS SHAPE THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE

Malaysia and Indonesia

**Editors** 


Mohamad Saifudin Mohamad Saleh Nur Atikah A Rahman Didik Haryadi Santoso



# Content

Preface Introduction		vii ix
Chapter 1	Towards the Sustainability of Newspapers in Malaysia: Practice and Content Mohamad Saifudin Mohamad Saleh	1
Chapter 2	"Is My Handphone Spying on Me?" The Effect of Digital Footprint in Predictive Advertising Sharifah Nadiah Syed Mukhiar	9
Chapter 3	Rant Today and Regret it Forever! The Power of Self-Branding on Social Media Towards Job Employments in Malaysia Nur Atikah A Rahman	17
	Non-Institutional Citizen Journalism: Accidental Journalism in Malaysia Rani Ann Balaraman	25
	New Media and the Delusions of Freedom: From the Ethical to Political Economy Problem St. Tri Guntur Narwaya	33

Public Engagement on Online Media Industry Chapter 6 in Indonesia Didik Haryadi Santoso & Pawito News Aggregator and Online Media Chapter 7 Business Challenges in Indonesia Olivia Lewi Pramesti & Rosalia Prismarini Nurdiarti Chapter 8 Instagram Journalism and News Ethics on Social Media: Indonesian Perspective Rani Dwi Lestari occupity of authors fi ec as air bo



# Public Engagement on Online Media Industry in Indonesia

Didik Haryadi Santoso & Pawito

## INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the internet and digital technology has far-reaching its initial features. Internet begun from military tools to be democratic hope that may foster decentralised freedom of speech (Sunstein, 2008). In 1990s Indonesia, although text messaging was quite popular, but the internet was not a dominant platform for cultural, political, and social intercourse yet because of limited smartphone owner and unavailability of social media. Thus, conventional media, namely television newspaper, and radio remain as the primary account for public affairs.

However, the Indonesian media landscape gradually changing is the subsequent decades by the arriving of social media. At this period unidentified social phenomenon initially occurring. For example, the Gecko vs Crocodile case (KPK case) and Koin for Prita case, which has successfully rose scholarly attention. Following the cases. Lim (2013)

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### Didik Haryadi Santoso Pawito

### Introduction

The emergence of the internet ,and digital technology has far-reaching its initial features. Zuboff (1988), for example, noted that autonomous calculation, and forecast through computer-mediated exchanges might become plausibly widespread in upcoming future. In 1990s Indonesia, although text messaging was quite popular, butthe internet was not a dominant platform for cultural, political, and social intercourse yet. Conventional media, namely television, newspaper, and radio were the primaryaccount of public affairs.

However, the media I and scape gradually changing in subsequent decades and by the arriving of social media at Indonesia lives, an unidentified phenomenon initially occurred. For example, the Gecko vs Crocodile case (KPK case) ,and Koin for Prita case, which had successfully rose scholarly attention. Following the cases, Lim (2013) addresses the dynamics of the relationship between social media ,and its user in generating social or political activism. Yet, the threshold of social media occupancy exp and ed into a more complex array. It provides organic content, decentralised processing and interaction, and various forms of media format (,and reas, 2007). Top-down power embedded in conventional media has toppled down by social media.

Although the opportunities within social media seem promising for democratic life, its malicious power also follows. Social media features, namely, anonymity, data-footprint, and the absence of editorial gate provides a pre-condition for more sophisticated social and political orchestration. Russia, for instance, has long-standing media ecology manipulation history by locating the digital sphere and non-digital sphere in different treatment(Sanovich 2019). Vladimir Putin's regime weighing his surveillance and monopoly over Russia's conventional media, while at the same time let the digital sphere open widely for freedom of speech but meddled with inaudible sophisticated propagand a tools and institutions (Sanovich 2019).

Besides playing its domestic media ecology with the respective orchestration, Russia also interferes Ukraine's media ecology with autonomous agents and Big Data tasked manipulation of public opinion (Zhadanova & Orlova 2019). Similarly, bots for amplifying or dampening political actor or news is inevitable for Canada 2015 federal election (Dubois & McKelvey 2019). In the United States, fake-news had become the promising new-comers of the media industry (Viner 2016). These examples show that the traditional method of public opinion manipulation commonly practised by the political regime through a centralised command in conventional media has transformed by the new media into a more distributed and dynamic form.

This transformation was outbreaks worldwide with different panorama and unexceptionally Indonesia (Bradshaw & Howard 2019). A report from Oxford Internet Institute, *The Global Disinformation Disorder 2019*, notes that Indonesia's digital propaganda was involving political parties and the private sector (Bradshaw & Howard 2019). The practice ranged from the usage of a buzzer, influencer, to troll, and online news fabrication (see: Jati 2017; Sugiono 2020). Pertinent to that, Jati (2017) points out that political buzzer often outcast mini-story and explanatory thread, with academic-looking style and technocratic tone to convince as well as to engage public discourse in the short-term issue.

In the midst of this technological fabrication, although there is a growing number of research on how online agents operate and influence Indonesian public discourse, thisenthusiasm remains limited on political economy perspective (Sugiono 2020), how online agent's recruitment works (CIPG 2017), how its impact on the electoral process (see: Juditha 2019; Felicia 2018), and on social activism (Jati 2017).

As a form of contribution to detailed insights, it is crucial to shed light on how new media transform Indonesian public engagement in online news consumption. By using 'Nationalism' discourse as an example of computational exercise against social life, this article aims to describe the role ,and the relation of the buzzer, influencer, and online news in transforming public engagement on a particular public issue.

### **New Media: The Circular Event**

Before the digital age, political actor or group has to acquire the extraction of survey, report or any limited content analysis from conventional media before showing their interest within. These data are necessary to ensure that the agenda is heading in the right direction. Nonetheless, these conventional data were included with no integrated data-set and no detailed audience profiling. In contrast, new media swallows an unprecedented amount of user data, and it opens for individual, commercial or governmental access with fragile restrictions. Moreover, giant tech-firms, namely Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon, are managing the Big Data with integrated autonomous intelligence agents internally.

These facilities, the Big Data and the smart-autonomous managerial system, are the differential point for new media from conventional media. The outcome of this transformation epitomises within what contemporary observers call as cognitive bias (see: McIntyre 2018), personalised world-view (see: Parisier 2013; Fuller 2019; Sunstein 2008), algorithmic cleavages (Lim 2017), affective contagions (Papacharissi 2015), and computational propaganda (Woolley & Howard 2019). As well as capitalism logic, this digital technology precisely working on the purpose of prediction, and modification of human behaviour as a means to produce revenue and market control (Zuboff 2015), and obtain political control of discursive domination.

After shrewd calculation, analysis, and prediction in moulding user's behaviour (Zuboff 2019), an online eventcan metamorph into a real-life event (Kalpokas 2019), and at the same time may contains attracting news value for the news outlet. Online-moulded mass mob deemed as a manifestation of social solidarity against the collectively opposed narratives. Therefore, the blurring boundaries between digital and real-life encourage event to be circularly distributed from *byte* to material manifestation and vice versa (e.g., Tirtosudarmo & Hadi 2019). The following example confirms that claims. Nationalism digital discourse shows that the most influential actors were predominantly coming from the buzzer, influencer, and untrusted fanpage.

### Top Influencers

By Collected Mentions - By Total Retweets




Table ∀iew Avatar ∀iew				
No.	Account Name	RT + Reply Count		
1	@ustadtengkuzul	6,509		
2	@ChristWamea	5,361		
3	@geloraco	5,021		
4	@kandargalang	4,278		
5	@podoradong	3,644		
6	@MaspiyuO	3,023		
7	@Aiek_Channel	2,550		
8	@AntiBuzzeRp	2,281		
9	@fullmoonfolks	2,158		
10	@umar_hasibuan75	1,970		

Figure 1. The five most influential accounts

However, there is a long-standing history behind these accounts as well as the competition among the three dominant ideologies in Indonesia: Islamism, Nationalism, and Technocracy (see: Mietzner 2020). The five most influential accounts benefited from algorithmic content distribution in receiving public engagement. @ustadtengkuzul, @podoradongand @geloraco are coming from Islamism stream. @chriswamea derived his fluency through ultra-nationalist narratives, while @kandargalang stand as nationalist opposition.

Avatar	User	Status	#Followers	#Retweeted	All Time	Sentiment
1	ChristWamea @ChristWamea	Akhirnya Pilkada SUMBAR tanpa PDIP. Semoga suatu saat Indonesia juga tanpa PDIP biar Indonesia bebas dari buzzer, narasi2 pecah belah, politik pencitraan, politik dinasti dan oligarki. Dan tidak ada lagi yg mau utak atik pancasila. Indonesia aman dan damai.  O 6/Sep/2020 09:00 WIB L	45,678	2,736	<b>13</b> 3,051 <b>♥</b> 10,024	Positive 99.93 % Edit
2	Bhagavad Sambadha @fullmoonfolks	NKRI ini kalau urusan investasi dari sabang sampe merauke disuruh baris ikrar harga mati, begitu urusan pandemi "ya kan susah ngurus negara sebesar ini, warganya juga pada bandel." Emang lebih cocok jadi ormas daripada negara.  O 10/Sep/2020 02:14 WIB Lat/Graph	106,340	1,984	±3,143 ♥ 5,084	Positive 61.64 % Edit
3	tengkuzulkarnain @ustadtengkuzul	Kenapa MUI diserang secara masif? Buzzers dikerahkan, bahkan umat seberang Agama Islam pun ikut menyerang MUI, dan para personal MUI? Jawabnya terang benderang, Krn MUI menolak RUU HIP dan RUU BPIP. Ada kekuatan pro Komunis dan Raksasa besar yg TERGANGGU Umat Rapatkan Barisan! O 9/Sep/2020 07:34 WIB LallGraph	393,827	1,961	<b>t3</b> 2,248 <b>♥</b> 7,014	Positive 59.2 % Edit
4	lskandar # @kandargalang	#ILCPuan HASRIL Chaniago (Tokoh Pers Sumatera Barat)"  ARTERIA DAHLAN (PDIP) ini Kakeknya ituPendiri "PKI ( Partai Komunis ) di Sumatera Barat" & anggota konstituante setalah Pemilu 1955 (Arsipkan=) https://tco/7dNMv0jQ75  © 9/Sep/2020 02:30 WIB LalGraph	17,120	1,921	t₃ 2,181 ♥ 4,574	Positive 53.88 % Edit
5	ChristWamea @ChristWamea	HASRIL CHANIAGO (Tokoh Pers Sumbar):  Kakek dari ARTERIA DAHLAN (Kader PDIP) adalah Pendiri "PKI di Sumatera Barat" dan mrpkan anggota konstituante stlh Pemilu 1955.  Pantasan selama ini karakternya tak beretika. https://t.co/kjd3RgEz3c  © 9/Sep/2020 06.23 WIB LettGraph	45,760	1,823	t⊋ 2.170 ♥ 5,121	Positive 96.27 % Edit
6	Z0EM1ENT12 @DZ03MIENT12	Cucu pendiri PKI. Arsipkan dulu https://t.co/QqxWxYrvJY  © 9/Sep/2020 00:42 W/B LatGraph	25,180	1,596	t₃ 1,912 ♥ 5,256	Negative 49.69 % Edit
7	Hilmi Firdausi @Hilmi28	Setelah statement Aku bangga jadi anak PKI. Apakah akan ada statement Aku bangga jadi cucu PKI ? Kalau saya jelas "Aku bangga jadi musuh PKI".  © 9/Sep/2020 09:14 WIB LadGraph	284,048	1,533	t₃ 1,907 ♥ 8,311	Negative 52.51 % Edit

Figure 2. Most Retweeted Tweets

Figure 2 shows that an adequate number of retweets may have significant exposure when the respective account owns numerous followers. Furthermore, vice versa, the respective account may obtain significant publicity, although he hadonly a small number of followers his tweets were retweeted enormously. Thus, in new media, the distribution of power is decentralised in a more personalised way and predominantly not embedded within online news, contrast than conventional media.

However, this does not solely make online news outlet entirely irrelevant to the information society. Figure 3 reflects that online news remains preferable for online discussion although at the same time also less influential than buzzer or influencer's opinion. Nevertheless, the pattern of online news consumption is apparently predetermined by personal ideology, world-view or affiliation. Besides, figure 3 confirms that when an online outlet is backed-up with its social media account, it is inherently foster their exposure: @geloraco obtain 5,021

### Twitter ▶ Shared Sites

Categories ▼ > Isu ▼ > NASIONALISME

### Twitter

### **Most Shared Sites**

No	Sites	#Shared	IP	Traffic
1	www.gelora.co	3,443	74.125.130.121	SimilarWeb
2	www.oposisicerdas.com	997	74.125.130.121	SimilarWeb
3	cnn.id	748	149.129.250.54	SimilarWeb
4	corpsnews.com	720	144.91.71.82	SimilarWeb
5	news.idtoday.co	630	172.67.189.32	SimilarWeb
6	www.swarakyat.com	574	74.125.130.121	SimilarWeb
7	m.detik.com	408	103.49.221.206	SimilarWeb
8	news.detik.com	375	103.49.221.187	SimilarWeb
9	www.kompasiana.com	363	13.224.250.82	SimilarWeb
10	historia.id	338	52.221.12.251	SimilarWeb

Figure 3 Most Shared Sites

engagement (see: figure 1) while the sharing rate of www.gelora.co reaches 3,443 (figure 3).

### **Conclusion**

The distributive character of new media has led into a more subtle practice of public engagement engineering. Its ability to calculate, predict and being mined is significantly affecting how the public sees the world. It also affects how they were initiating public discussion, whether with a political touch from a hidden stakeholder or without.

In the nationalism case, Indonesia's public is more engaged in online tweets than online news, although at some occasion online news is also being shared alongside with and to gives different persuasion of reality. This landscape's transformation reconfigures the position of discursive power. Discursive power which previously monopolised by political figure or media firm now has to be shared through buzzer and influencer. In advance, the performance of buzzer and influencer in social media often collaborate with their affiliative websites to hook public engagement.

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